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ABSTRACT
Fire presents a clear and present danger to computer equipment and generally
results in tremendous expense or irreplaceable loss. This study serves as a
proof of concept for using computer-based fire modeling to investigate the
resilience of typical data center equipment to fire. In this analysis, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology’s Fire Dynamics Simulator computerbased fire modeling tool is utilized to simulate fire scenarios within a rack-mountstyle computer enclosure containing six circuit boards. Outcomes including
effects of combustion (heat, mixture fraction, and species generation) and waterbased sprinkler suppression are explored. Although the presence of standard
water-based sprinkler suppression proves advantageous, it is not consistently
effective in terminating this class of combustion. Results indicate that fire’s
thermal effects constitute the largest impact and ultimately determine component
survivability. The use of computer-based simulation proves to be a valuable tool
in the ultimate enhancement of electronic equipment tenability.
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Chapter 1
Overview

1.1

Introduction

As electronic and computer technology continues to advance, its scope and
application grows. With this growth comes a torrent of calculation and data that
lends itself to other needs such as processing, storage, retrieval, accessibility—
the list is endless. Within the context of the corporate world, the magnitude of
these needs expands almost exponentially. Thus enters an army of rackmounted computer and data storage systems aligned in rank and file performing
their duties.

Imagine yourself at the technological helm of a large corporation. As manager of
information systems, you are ultimately responsible for the storage and safety of
hundreds or thousands of employees’ files and data sets. For years, it has been
business as usual. Then, one day, someone notices a light on the fire alarm
control panel. Before anyone can say a word, the fire alarm claxon sounds and
the building is evacuated. Firefighters arrive on the scene and race into the
entrances. The atmosphere is charged with conversation and conjecture. You
wait for what seems an eternity when, suddenly, the “all clear” signal is sounded
and you are permitted to re-enter the building. You immediately head for the
data center. Upon entry, to your horror, you stare into the charred and sooty
1

remains of a once pristine computer room. Two words echo hollowly in your
head, “What happened?” Sadly, without appropriate fire suppression and
preventative measures, this scenario is an all-too-likely reality.

Whether

initiated via human interaction, mechanical failure, electrical malfunction, or any
of a myriad of possible sources, fire embodies just one of a computer data
center’s most devastating foes. Ironically, through mathematical and physical fire
modeling, computers are now able to fight back. With the aid of computer fire
modeling, one can better visualize and understand the threats that fire presents
to electronic equipment.

1.2

Historical Context

Although a distinction between corporate and household electrical fire
significance can be drawn with respect to scale, in the end, both types result in
physical and financial devastation. To assist in bringing this threat into focus,
one may turn to recorded fire data. In household situations alone, Britain’s 1999
fire census shows that 10% of all recorded fire occurrences originated with
electrical equipment. These fires account for 19% of the United Kingdom’s firerelated injuries and are the most costly, averaging slightly more than $7,000 per
incident [1]. Canada, in 2000, cites over 7,400 electrically-linked blazes totaling
225,068,279 Canadian Dollars (CAD) [2]. Finally, in the United States,
household electrical fires accounted for 38,300 fires in 1998. These fires
resulted in 284 deaths, 1,184 injuries, and $668.8 million in property damages
2

[3]. More recently, in 2000, U.S. public fire services recorded 1,708,000 fires
causing approximately $11 billion in property damages. Building structure fires
account for 505,500 of these incidents and 5,800 are designated as office fires
leading to an average of nearly $130 million in property damages. Of these
office fires, 37% were electrical in origin [1]. Bearing these statistics in mind, the
vulnerability of data centers and seriousness of electrical and electronic fires may
be readily seen via a brief inspection of historical case studies.

Scenarios, like the aforementioned, have been documented world-wide for years.
One excellent example of this surfaces in Illinois Bell’s Hinsdale Central Office
fire affecting over 0.5 million customers [4]. Damaging only 60 minicomputers,
the fire’s effects rippled on for almost 21-23 days and interrupted several
hundred Chicago ATMs, a national motel’s regional reservation system, and 166
thousand local and long distance telephone circuits [5]. Although the specific
cause is still unknown, the battery backup power system was involved and
resulted in an estimated 40-60 million dollars in damages in 1988 [6]. A chilling
reality, as demonstrated in the Hinsdale office, is that the fire’s scale need not be
large to cause significant damage or interruption of service. Another, more
recent, instance of destruction in a data center is The Treasury’s fire. Serving as
a leading economic and financial advising group in New Zealand, The Treasury
experienced damages in July 1995 as their main computer room’s UPS
(Uninterruptible Power Supply) ignited [7]. In case after case, computer fire
3

damage’s pervasiveness can be observed. Additional examples include the
1997 U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) [8], 1969
Zurich-Hottingen telephone exchange [9], and 1988 Los Angeles First Interstate
Bank Building [10] fires. Although relatively benign in comparison, CECOM’s
Research, Development and Engineering Center suffered computer room
damages as a workstation erupted into flame [8]. In the Zurich-Hottingen case,
extensive destruction resulted as PVC insulated cables burned and corrosive
gases penetrated the building’s infrastructure including reinforced steel and
concrete [9]. Finally, the First Interstate Bank blaze, labeled as “the high-rise fire
you can’t put out” and requiring the combined efforts of 383 firefighters and
paramedics for over 3.5 hours, destroyed five of the building’s 62 floors. The
fire’s origin is believed to be electrical in nature and resided near a number of
personal computers [10]. However, computer data center fires are not solely
limited to electrical equipment failure.

Human error, vandalism/arson, and terrorist acts comprise additional threats to
data centers. Incidents of human error are typically as simple as incorrect
cigarette disposal, unintentional fraying of an A/V cart’s extension cord, or a
spilled beverage. Although accidental, these mistakes have the potential to
result in devastating loss. Equally as destructive, albeit malicious in nature, are
vandalism/arson and terrorism. These themes introduce the element of criminal
intent, but must be considered. The premeditated incident at Penn Mutual Life
4

Insurance’s data processing facility depicts one such occasion. Initial firedamage estimates totaled $8 million which included the loss of two IBM 3081
mainframes, eleven DASD strings, and an unspecified quantity of
microcomputers and peripherals [11]. Further illustrations include the 1993
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. In this instance, non-thermal damage
from smoke and corrosive fire products was documented throughout Tower One,
including floors 16-90, and necessitated equipment restoration and replacement.
In 1990, Karydas surveyed, itemized, and categorized a number of large-loss
(greater than $1 million), non-thermal, fire-related property damage occurrences
[12]. These instances and their resulting damages, involving electrical
equipment (electrical), flammable/combustible materials (incendiary), tobacco
smoking (smoking), and various other ignition sources (miscellaneous), are
summarized in Tables 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. This information shows that electrical
systems account for over a third of the fires cited and an estimated $48 million in
non-thermal damages alone.

An additional point for consideration is that data center fires do not only result in
physical loss. Even when data is not lost, an unexpected fire can pit one against
insurmountable odds. Frequently, especially when unforgiving schedules are
involved, a resultant loss of service may necessitate project outsourcing and can
be more difficult to overcome than merely replacing equipment. The National
Weather Service’s 1999 computer room fire serves as an occasion where a
5

Table 1.2.1. Fire Occurrences: Ignition Source [12]
Source
Number of Incidents
Electrical
10.5
Incendiary
7.5
Smoking
4.5
Miscellaneous
4.0
Total
30.0

Percent of Total
35
24
15
13
100

Table 1.2.2. Fire Occurrences: Property Damage [12]
Losses
Losses
Percent
Property
(number)
($ Millions)
(number)
Electrical
10
48
33
Textile
5.0
24
17
Building/Equipment 8.5
20
28
Merchandise
5.0
13
17
Foodstuff
1.5
11
5
Total
30
116
100
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Percent
($)
41
21
17
11
10
100

viable solution was achieved through an outsourcing arrangement after losing a
CRAY C-90 forecasting supercomputer [13]. However, not all situations work out
so favorably.

1.3

Scope

This research investigates the realm of electrical and computer equipment fire
tenability. It begins with an overview of available information and provides
historical context grounding. The text then continues (in Chapter 2) with an
explanation of the various types of computer fire hazards and explores current
and previous fire suppression methodologies. After reviewing the inherent
dangers, Chapter 3, contains an overview of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology’s (NIST) software-based fire modeling and analysis tools—Fire
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) and Smokeview. Chapter 4 outlines the specific
investigative approach and model constructed (including observed parameters
and assumptions). Experimental data and outcomes are analyzed in Chapter 5.
Finally, Chapter 6, culminates with conclusions and recommendations for future
work.
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Chapter 2
Background

2.1

Computer Fire Hazards

As alluded to previously, computer fire hazards are not merely limited to thermal
exposure. Although intense heat produced by combustion obviously poses a
massive threat to the electronic hardware and storage media typically contained
in a data center, additional dangers do exist. These dangers include immediate
and long-term damaging mechanisms alike. The United States Department of
Energy (DOE) organizes these hazards into three primary categories—heat,
smoke corrosivity, and soot deposition [4].

Several factors play a part in determining a fire’s heat release rate. These
elements include the fuel’s chemical composition, the fuel’s orientation, the
room’s size and shape, and the room’s vent arrangement. Objects within the
room are viewed from the fire’s perspective as additional fuel sources or targets.
Thermal damage can be attributed directly to flame impingement, radiative heat
flux, and convection. As a fire continues to burn, its plume forms an upper layer
of heated gases. The flames, upper gas layer, compartment walls, and heated
surfaces are all sources of radiative heat. Additionally, if a target is immersed
within the upper gases, convection increases the thermal intensity and
subsequent damage. For materials typically contained in a data center, heat
8

fluxes of less than 10 kW/m2 will not incur auto-ignition [4]. However,
temperatures of 79.4°C (175°F) are high enough to damage functioning
computer equipment [14]. These heat levels are also sufficient to cause plastic
elements such as keyboards, PVC conduits, monitors, cable insulations, printers,
or tape backup media to melt or deform. As evidenced by the 1988 Harwell tests
conducted in the U.K., computer tapes provide a ready fuel source that enables
fires of particularly-high ferocity and tenacity to develop [5]. One source states
that temperatures of 75°C (165°F) will ruin tapes and disk packs while
temperatures of 55°C (133°F) will damage diskette media [15]. The National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) sets the bar even lower, citing destructive
temperatures as low as 37.8°C (100°F) for magnetic and flexible media, with
possible successful reconditioning up to 48.9°C (120°F), and 65.6°C (150°F) for
disc media [14]. Reconditioning efforts typically involve physical media
extraction, cleaning, drying, and duplication within a contaminant-free
environment. In the event that temperatures exceed the ignition points of
flammable materials within the compartment, flashover occurs. In either a direct
flame impingement or a flashover scenario, it is unlikely that any electronic or
computer equipment will survive. However, flammable materials aren’t the only
objects capable of sustaining damage. Inflammable objects, such as metallic
racks, computer cases, and hard drives, may still experience mechanical
stressing and physical deformation. Factory Mutual’s established thermal
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thresholds conclude that significant thermal damage may result at temperatures
of 175°F (79°C) and malfunction at 140°F (60°C) [16].

One of the less immediate sources of damage is that of corrosion. Operating on
the molecular level, the corrosive effects of a fire are more difficult to assess and
may not be immediately evaluated. Table 2.1.1 provides a listing of the various
types, descriptions, common locations, and causes of corrosion commonly
involved. With the introduction of integrated circuits (ICs), the component scale
is drastically reduced. As computer technology continues to evolve, circuits and
their interconnects are becoming smaller and more compact. Therefore, as
these minimizing efforts continue, even a small amount of corrosion can affect a
large number of circuit bridges, solder joints, IC packages, and even the circuit
board itself. From an engineering perspective, these corrosive effects result in
compromises in circuit integrity leading to metal loss, reduced conductivity,
current leaks, short circuits, and system failure. However, to an end user, these
same effects manifest themselves in the form of component discoloration,
“glitchy” operation, data corruption or loss, frustration, and ultimately, repair
costs. Given the combustible materials commonly present in computer and
electronic equipment (e.g. wiring insulation, PVC, polymethylmethacrylate
(PMMA), and various plastics), the generation of a number of corrosive agents is
possible. Even small quantities of burning PVC may produce environments
capable of damaging electronic equipment [17]. Typical toxic pyrolysis agents
10

Table 2.1.1. Types of Corrosion [18-22]
Type
Description
Localized surface
Pitting
corrosion in form of
divots

Location
Scattered across
surface

Cause
Uneven distribution
of corrosive agent on
surface
Aggregated
concentration of
corrosive agent
within small area
Even distribution of
corrosive agent on
surface

Crevice

Similar to pitting,
corrosive agent pools
within junction

Metal and nonmetal junction

Uniform

Equally-distributed
surface corrosion

Entire surface

Two-Metal

In corrosive agent,
more corrosionresistant metal
corrodes slower and
less resistant faster
than if separate

Two dissimilar
metal junction

Electron flow is
enhanced at junction

Stress

Material under tensile
stress subjected to
corrosive agent

Stress
Imperfections
across surface

Stress-induced
cracking, tensile
stress, larger surface
area
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include hydrochloric acid (HCl), hydrofluoric acid (HF), hydrobromic acid (HBr),
nitric acid (HNO3), sulfuric acid (H2SO4), carbolic acid/phenol (C6H5OH), and
acetic acid (CH3COOH) [4]. Table 2.1.2 lists some typical acid-forming gases
and their corrosive potential airborne concentrations.

Perhaps, the most common corrosive agent found in fires of this nature is HCl.
In reality, gas concentrations have been shown to be lower than theoretical yields
[23, 24]. In the case of HCl, for example, concentrations do not typically exceed
200-300 ppm. Clean equipment chloride contaminant concentrations are
anticipated to be at or less than 10 µg/in2 and are typically 30-60 µg/in2 after 20
years [4]. These typical levels, however, are further refined depending on
organizational use. For example, equipment is classified as “clean” with a
chloride level of 14-17 µg/in2 for the military; less than 14 µg/in2 for IBM; and less
than 20 µg/in2 for Honeywell. In spite of this variation, it is commonly accepted
that chloride contamination levels of 30-50 µg/in2 dictate consideration for
reclamation [4]. Chloride contamination reconditioning falls into levels: less than
200 µg/in2, 200-600 µg/in2, and greater than 600 µg/in2 where less than 30 µg/in2
is considered a typical background concentration [25]. Categorical transitions
represent drastic increases in expense and difficulty. Similarly, acceptable
sulfate contamination levels have been established at less than 65 µg/in2 [4].
However, even trace amounts of corrosive agents may yield troublesome, if not

12

Table 2.1.2. Corrosive Potential Airborne Concentrations [26]
Gas

Acid (name)

Acid (formula)

HCl
HF
NO2
NO2
SO2
CH2COOH

Hydrochloric
Hydrofluoric
Nitrous
Nitric
Sulfuric
Acetic

HCl
HF
HNO2
HNO3
H2SO4
CH3COOH
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Concentration
(ppm)
100
100
100
100
1,000
1,000

disastrous, results over time. Table 2.1.3 summarizes general contaminant
levels, typical environmental conditions, and expected effects.

Although corrosive gas production is directly related to the type and quantity of
fuel source involved, studies have shown that increased heat and even fire
retardant additives may actually enhance a fire’s corrosive effects [27].
Ultimately, four factors shape the toxins’ resultant yields. These elements are:
up to 25% of the ions are trapped in charred portions of the target; 25% or more
of the ions condense near the fire; soot affects ion release and absorption; and
finally, the gases tend to decay in the atmosphere [4]. Lastly, a compartment’s
humidity serves as a source of enhancement for the corrosive effectiveness of
harmful gases. Excessive humidity levels will result in higher corrosive potential.
Acting alone, humidity levels of 85% or more will damage magnetic media [15].
However, minimal humidity levels encourage static electricity—a potentially more
deadly foe where electronics are concerned. Therefore, electronic salvage
processes typically establish guidelines for environments with relative humidity
levels of 30% [28].

A third, and final, fire hazard class is soot deposition. Defined as “particulate
materials composed of … carbon, resins, tar, and unburnt fuel,” soot production
is a direct function of the fuel source, burning environment, and duration of burn
[4]. Soot can be viewed as the airborne “filth” of a fire resulting in discoloration,
14

Table 2.1.3. Effects of Contamination [4]
Contamination Level
Ambient
Conditions/Typical
µg/cm2
µg/in2
Environment
Very reactive;
Humidity >50%; Hot
Above 77
Above 500
plastics fire; Seawater
spray
Reactive; Humidity
Above 30
Above 200
>60%; Medium to
heavy smoke
Factory environment;
Above 16
Above 100
Humidity 30-90% uncontrolled
Controlled
environment;
Above 8
Above 50
Humidity 45-55%;
Temp 65-75°F
Military standard
Above 3
Above 20
High reliability
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Effects
Metal
Surfaces

Electronics

Heavy
corrosion;
Catastrophic
failures
Active
Light rust;
corrosion;
Long term
Short term
Marginal
Moderate
effects; Long corrosion;
term
Long term
Slight
surface
None
corrosion;
Long term
Flash rust;
Etched
surfaces

None

None

mechanical damage, and electrical shorting of equipment. Its production may be
approximated via a ratio of masses of smoke versus fuel. Typical yields range
from 0.05 to 0.15 kg per kg of fuel [4]. Due to the incomplete combustion
coexistent with low-temperature fires, higher amounts of soot would be expected
in fires possessing a lower heat flux than that of more blistering conflagrations.
This particulate matter typically affects exposed, mechanical elements such as
cooling fans; floppy, magnetic tape, and optical drives; switching relays; analog
meters; and peripherals. It can also alter the effectiveness of thermal dissipaters
(heat sinks) and constitute a potential fire risk. Measured via Total Petroleum
Content (TPC), clean electronic equipment is typically rated at a level of 5 µg/in2
while equipment exceeding values of 50-100 µg/in2 is cause for concern [29]. As
a point of reference, post-fire measurements of soot, chloride, and halogen acid
contamination may exceed 5000 µg/in2 [4].

Based on DOE data, Table 2.1.4 itemizes source, projected temperature range,
possible heat flux, and anticipated level of damage for the three primary firerelated hazards. Individually, any of the three fire-related hazards (heat,
corrosion, or soot deposition) possesses the potential to dispatch disaster to
electronic equipment. Working in concert, as is common in a fire scenario, these
three elements most certainly thrive in ruin.

16

Table 2.1.4. Thermal Damage Thresholds [4]
Source
Temperature (°C)
Heat Flux (kW/m2)
Direct Flame
5-175 (possible)
330-1,070
Impingement
90-100 (typical)
Upper gas layer

Room temp. – 1,000
(postflashover)

Variable

Soot/Corrosive Gas

Lower temps.
(e.g., 50)

Variable

17

Damage
Unsalvageable
Dependent on temp
and oxygen
concentration
(Unsalvageable for
postflashover)
Failure or Reduced
Reliability

While the focus of this research is equipment rather than human tenability, it is
not uncommon for personnel to be present when a fire erupts. An employee’s or
fire fighter’s ability to function may play a critical role in a data center’s ultimate
survival. Therefore, Appendix A contains additional information related to human
fire risks.

2.2

Suppression Systems

Now that the most common damaging aspects of a fire have been explored, this
section investigates the previous and prospective approaches implemented in
dousing a blaze. It is a startling fact that nearly 50% of computer room fires
actually begin outside the room itself [30]. It is, therefore, imperative that the
entire building in which a data center is housed be protected by a fire
extinguishing system. Even so, one might assume that an effective means of
extinguishing a fire is all that is required to protect a data center and its
equipment. This supposition, however, is incorrect. Suppression is merely the
first gambit in a strategic game against time and the forces of nature.

Fire suppression brings with it a myriad of challenges and trade offs. Initial
attempts at electronic fire suppression paralleled the development of the bucket
brigade by pitting a fire against gallons of its arch foe, water. Elaborate piping
systems began to spring up in data centers everywhere transporting gallons of
water to the inferno. However, this strategy revealed an immediate opportunity
18

for process improvement. Unless equipment is specifically intended for wet
environments, shorting will occur if it is energized [31]. Therefore, the first step in
extinguishing a data center fire is typically to de-energize the electrical
equipment. Ultimately, there are two classes of water-based sprinkler systems—
wet pipe and dry pipe. A wet pipe system is composed of a grid of fusible-link
sprinkler heads connected by iron piping that is filled with water at all times. A
dry pipe system boasts the same grid structure, but possesses an additional
water release valve that separates it from its water supply. Instead of water, the
piping in a dry pipe system is initially filled with compressed gas (typically air or
nitrogen) until a fire is detected and the water release valve is opened. Both
systems hold advantages and disadvantages. These virtues and shortcomings
are cataloged in Table 2.2.1

Although commonplace, both types of sprinkler systems are limited by three
factors: relatively slow reaction time, quantity and method of extinguishment,
and installation flexibility. Commonly rated at 71.1°C (160°F), sprinkler heads
may allow surrounding air temperatures to reach as high as 260°C (500°F) [32].
Secondly, once a sprinkler system is activated, it must be shut down manually.
This allows for excessive amounts of (possibly dirty) water to spew onto
electronic equipment. Lastly, due to their method of operation, sprinkler systems
are typically limited to ceiling-level installation and don’t excel in the protection of
plenums above the ceiling or below the floor.
19

Table 2.2.1. Wet and Dry Pipe Sprinkler Systems [32]
Type
Advantage
Disadvantage
“Dirty” water; Temperature
Fast-acting; More common; sensitivity (freezing); FastWet Pipe
Simplicity; Cheaper
acting (in accidental-release
scenario)
Temperature insensitivity;
Increased expense; SlowerDry Pipe
Can construct elaborate
acting
“pre-action” systems

20

In an effort to improve response time and accuracy of activation, a myriad of
sensing and detection schemes are used to augment sprinkler systems.
Although three primary types of detectors exist, heat, fire/smoke (photoelectric
and ionization), and air sampling, only two are employed to give a data center its
ability to identify fire [32]. Because heat detectors are slower to react, a
suppression system relying on them for activation would allow a fire to grow too
large. Therefore, fire and air sampling detectors provide the higher level of
effectiveness necessitated in an electronic environment. Within the realm of
smoke detectors, the photoelectric variety more aptly recognizes thicker, darker
smoke. Meanwhile, ionization detectors are responsive to the hot gases of
combustion. Hence, both types are frequently used jointly to enhance the
chance of fire discovery. Air sampling detectors, although more expensive, offer
much higher sensitivity. Sporting a single chemical analysis element, multiple
plastic or copper tubes extend to and terminate in areas of concern. Air samples
are then pulled into the analyzer for examination. Through cross zoning (multiple
types of sensors in one area) or additive (suppression requires multiple sensor
activations) arrangements, highly elaborate fire detection systems may be
constructed.

Although addressing the issue of response time, the addition of sensors and
detectors does nothing to alleviate a sprinkler system’s installation limitations.
Therefore, gaseous agents with enhanced penetrative abilities enter the scene.
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Carbon dioxide (CO2) seemed an ideal total flooding alternative to water. By
removing the oxygen necessary for combustion, carbon dioxide simply smothers
a fire. However, at the concentrations required to extinguish a fire, typically 30%40%, carbon dioxide also smothers humans which require a minimum of 18%
oxygen to breathe. As a result, carbon dioxide systems are typically equipped
with a 90 second pre-activation alarm. This fact, in concert with 10 minute
extinguishing times and icy blast damage, undermined carbon dioxide’s
usefulness [15]. Therefore, its use has been relegated to localized applications
and portable fire extinguishers.

In an effort to find a less toxic, yet electronic-friendly, gaseous total flooding
agent, the halogens were enlisted. Occupying group seventeen of the periodic
table (Figure 2.2.1), halogens contain seven electrons in their outer shell and
form salts [33]. When a select number of the hydrogen atoms found in
hydrocarbons are replaced by members of the halogen family, a halogenated
hydrocarbon (also known as a halon) is produced [32]. However, as all isotopes
of astatine are radioactive, it is not amenable to this application [34]. Possessing
suitable properties (Table 2.2.2), the two derivative agents most commonly
employed in electronic fire suppression are Halon 1211
(bromochlorodifluoromethane, CF2ClBr) and Halon 1301 (bromotrifluoromethane,
CBrF3) [35]. Halon 1211 is two times more effective than carbon dioxide as a
portable extinguishing agent, as it exits a compressed container in liquid form
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Figure 2.2.1. Periodic Table: Halogens [33]
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Table 2.2.2. Halon Properties [32]
Type

Boiling Point

Halon 1211

25°F

Halon 1301

-70°F

Common
Properties
Gas at room
temp.; Leave little
or no residue; Not
electrically
conductive
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Common Use
Portable
Extinguisher
Total Flooding

and can be directed and streamed onto a fire from a distance of ten feet or more.
However, with its lower boiling point and smaller concentrations necessary to
extinguish a fire (approximately 5-7%), Halon 1301 serves as a more effective
total flooding agent [32]. Unlike carbon dioxide, Halon 1301 does not rely on
“flame cooling” or “oxygen exclusion” to extinguish a fire. Instead, it interacts
with the transient combustion products chemically to halt flame propagation [36].
Therefore, the maintenance of adequate Halon 1301 fire-stopping concentrations
is critical and it is recommended that a room be well sealed. In fact, due to poor
sealing and lack of enclosure integrity tests, the NFPA once calculated that over
50% of the halon installations in the United States alone may be ineffective [15].
In an attempt to compensate for possible compartment leakage, halon flooding
systems are typically designed to provide 8-10% concentrations to ensure that,
after 10-15 minutes, the necessary 5-7% concentration remains [32]. Under
proper conditions, Halon 1301 systems are capable of extinguishing a fire in 60
seconds and normal operation may resume after a brief ventilation period of two
hours [30]. However, it is a sobering fact that only 1 in 10 halon discharges
actually suppresses a fire with minimal damage [5]. Perhaps the most significant
benefit of Halon 1301 is its improved treatment of humans. Although it is not
side-effect free, at requisite levels, Halon 1301 will not suffocate people like
carbon dioxide. However, typical symptoms do include dizziness, cardiovascular
problems, or respiratory discomfort that will pass with the introduction of fresh
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air [32]. In extreme concentrations, higher than 10%, some individuals may
suffer from irregular heartbeats or central nervous system disorders [30].

Although Halon 1301 once appeared to be a panacea for computer-based fire
extinguishment, its expense and additional corrosive and atmospheric concerns
have turned the tide. Halon fire suppressants, unfortunately, contribute to the
production of harmful corrosive gases mentioned earlier. Hydrogen fluoride (HF)
and hydrogen bromide (HBr), for example, produce deleterious results when
exposed to printed circuit board protective coatings. Furthermore, the types of
components attached to circuit boards impact equipment failure rate. In
particular, CMOS (complementary metal oxide semiconductor) samples fail more
readily than NMOS (negative-channel metal oxide semiconductor) and TTL
(transistor transistor logic) circuits [37]. However, it is of interest to note that
magnetic tape seems to posses more resilience to halogenated atmospheres. In
tests performed by Ansul, DuPont, Cardox, and Fenwal, hydrogen fluoride
concentrations of less than 294 ppm and hydrogen bromide levels of less than 39
ppm did not appear to negatively affect recorded magnetic tape [17]. However,
halons also act as de-greasers and will, over time, result in data loss by
weakening the bond between the tape’s Mylar backing and data layer [5].
Another critically important factor is halon’s negative environmental impact.
Halon, similar to that of chlorinated fluorocarbons (CFCs) used in aerosol
propellants, some solvents, and Freon refrigerants, promotes the deterioration of
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Earth’s ozone layer. In fact, with ozone depletion potentials of 10 for Halon 1301
and 3 for Halon 1211, as compared to 0.5 for common CFCs, halon is actually
more aggressive [15]. After recognizing this fact, almost 50 nations (including
the United States) established the Montreal Protocol of 1987. It outlines taxation
and usage-reduction guidelines on CFCs (including halon) resulting in near total
abandonment by 2005 [32]. Shortly after the Montreal Protocol was established,
halon consumption dropped substantially. Oddly enough, this decline is primarily
attributed to the use of alternate test methods and the reduction of discharge
checks during system installation. Appendix B contains an at-a-glance
comparative summary of the advantages and disadvantages of water-based and
Halon 1301-based extinguishing systems.

Today, various hybridized systems are being employed to ensure computer room
protection. Typical combinations include gas-water hybrids where sprinklers are
arranged for maximum in-room coverage and gaseous agents (both carbon
dioxide and halon) augment system effectiveness within plenum spaces and
select areas where damage and exposure risks are low. Another modern fire
suppression technique that has been gaining recognition is water misting. With
testing in Heritage Buildings, prospective application in telecommunications
facilities, and interest from organizations such as the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), the Factory Mutual (FM), and a host of others (Appendix C),
water mist systems may become the next hope for computer rooms as well.
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Operating in a similar fashion to existing water-based sprinkler systems, mist
systems produce much smaller water droplets that aggregate to form a dense
fog. Water droplet sizes are typically on the order of 300-400 microns, but may
be smaller than 10-30 microns [38]. Another factor benefiting electronic
equipment, research has shown that a fire’s smoke plume is typically more
conductive than the suppressing water mist [39]. This reduces the potential of
arcing damage before equipment is de-energized. Although somewhat arbitrarily
defined, water mist systems may be divided into four categories: high pressure
(7,000 kPa/1,000 psi) with extremely fine droplets, intermediate pressure (690
kPa/100 psi) with high flow, low flow (being tested for aircraft use), and
pneumatic (gas-assisted atomization) systems [40]. Demonstration testing
performed by the U.K., Europe, and the U.S. have shown that water mist nozzles
may be effective in suppressing fire outbursts, especially when placed within
electronic equipment racks or between open-door cabinet aisle ways [41]. In
fact, tests conducted by Kidde-Fenwal, GTE, and FSI Research demonstrated
that, under specific conditions, it is possible to extinguish vertical rack printed
circuit board fires within one to two seconds using less than one liter (0.26
gallons) of water [39]. However, misting still suffers from two daunting
unknowns: the most successful process involved in extinguishing a fire and the
most effective manner of ensuring correct droplet size and transport [40]. It is
clear that standardization and testing is needed. In fact, the NFPA defers to fullscale testing as the only reliable method of testing to ensure effectiveness [41].
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However, water misting is not without weakness. Table 2.2.3 identifies potential
human safety advantages and concerns of water mist systems. Although water
mist systems may possess great potential, progress has been slow due to
wavering commitment and the existence of other suppression systems.

Equipped with an arsenal of destruction including heat, corrosion, and soot, fire
can bring about disaster where electronic equipment is concerned. Fire damage
may manifest itself immediately, as in cases of direct flame impingement, or over
great lengths of time, where corrosion is encountered. Although fire detection
and suppression systems provide a method of battling fires once they occur, a
preemptive means of modeling possible fire scenarios and predicting hazards is
even more desirable. This type of prognostic environment is precisely where
computer fire modeling software tools come into play.
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Table 2.2.3. Human Safety Advantages and Concerns of Water Mist [40]
Advantages
Disadvantages
• Cool gas temperatures
• Acidic gases combined with smaller
droplets may allow deep respiratory
• Remove toxins and soot from
transport
smoke-filled environment
• Steam-type injuries possible
• Reduced visibility possible due to
gas layer destratification
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Chapter 3
Software Tools

3.1

Description and Requirements

Since National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) public release of
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) Version 1 in February 2000, the field of computer
fire modeling has advanced substantially. This advancement has resulted in the
subsequent releases of Version 2 (December 2001) and Version 3.1 (April 15th,
2003) [42, 43]. These versions, as well as pre-release Version 4, may currently
be downloaded from NIST’s FDS and Smokeview download page
(http://fire.nist.gov/fds/refs/download.htm). Based on the Fortran and C
programming languages, FDS will function on multiple computing platforms.
Several pre-compiled versions already exist for Microsoft Windows or
UNIX/Linux-based machines. However, NIST also provides the source code for
compilation and porting to additional operating systems.

Although the FDS software package exists as a single, installable package, it is
in fact, a combination of two extremely powerful programs. The components are
individually recognized as FDS and Smokeview. NIST succinctly defines FDS as
“a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow” [42].
Simply stated, FDS performs the intense mathematical calculations involved in
simulating a fire-based environment. FDS exists as a command-line-driven
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program that requires an input file used to describe the fire scenario. This data
file includes parameters such as room and target dimensions, materials, reaction
type, and calculation parameters. Its companion piece, Smokeview, provides a
three dimensional graphical user interface (GUI) typically used to view FDS’s
simulation output. In recent versions, Smokeview has been enhanced and
endowed with the ability to assist in rapid, point-and-click type generation of fire
scenes.

The software’s minimum computer requirements are stated as a 1 GHz Pentium
III (or equivalent) with 512 MB of RAM [42]. Although these requirements are not
outlandish by today’s standards, they are important. Processor speed and
memory are two of the largest bottlenecks in performing FDS fire calculations
and are directly tied to simulation completion time. It may be obvious that a
faster processor results in faster calculations. However, inadequate memory
sizes will slow even the fastest CPU. As additional calculations occur, further
memory is required. Once the portion of RAM allocated to FDS (directly
determined by the total system memory capacity) is filled, the memory contents
are temporarily stored on the hard drive. This process is known as “swapping”
and is one method of virtually increasing a computer’s memory capacity.
However, this process bogs a computer by increasing its operational overhead.
Larger system memory configurations will reduce instances of data swapping.
Two additional computer hardware considerations are hard drive storage and
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video card functionality. As stated in the FDS user’s manual, depending on
complexity, it is not uncommon for a single simulation to require one gigabyte (or
more) of storage for output files [42]. A simulation’s complexity is affected by a
number of factors including: computational grid scale, fire size, reaction, and
whether or not supplemental elements such as boundary, slice/vector, particle,
isosurface, or PLOT3D files are generated. As is common in the realm of
computers, faster machines with larger amounts of memory and storage are
better suited for the task at hand.

3.2

Editing

Armed with an understanding of appropriate syntax (detailed in the FDS User’s
Guide), the process of creating and editing an input file is relatively
straightforward. In addition to learning FDS syntax, it is also extremely helpful to
know the FDS standard naming conventions, as shown in Figure 3.2.1. Although
not a requirement, input files typically end with a “.data” extension and define a
fire scenario, as previously mentioned. The FDS database is an additional
source file possessing the “.data” extension. Serving as more of an informational
repository, the database file is included in the FDS installation and need not be
edited. Instead, it includes material and reaction-specific information used in
performing the fire simulation. These files are merely text files and may be
established and altered in any text editor of choice (Notepad, Wordpad, Microsoft
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Figure 3.2.1. FDS Naming Conventions [44]
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Word, etc.). After the file has been created and the fire scenario has been
sufficiently described, simulation may begin.

3.3

Simulation

The act of FDS simulation is also straightforward, assuming a few guidelines are
followed. As a command-line tool, FDS begins when instantiated via the fds3
executable file. However, when called, it does not know the input file name.
Therefore, the input data file must be specified when FDS is called. This is
accomplished with a command-line operator and looks like fds3 < inputfile.data.
The less than sign is actually a data redirection operator that sends the input
data to FDS. While simulating, FDS generates output including simulation
dimensions, time step, parameter calculation, run time messages, and various
other values. By default, this output is directed to the screen where it streams by
and scrolls into oblivion. However, the default screen output can be redirected,
in a similar fashion to the input data, to an output data file via a greater than
symbol. Following convention, the output file typically ends with a “.out”
extension. All of these operations, the FDS call, input file redirect, and output file
redirect, may be accomplished simultaneously on the same command line. The
final resulting statement is fds3 < inputfile.data > outputfile.out.

In addition to aforementioned screen output, depending on user specifications,
FDS may generate a number of data files as shown in Figure 3.2.1. The
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Smokeview input file is always generated and serves as the connecting link
between FDS and Smokeview. Once executed, Smokeview is capable of
opening files with the “.smv” extension and may be directed to load and display
any combination of generated FDS output files associated with a particular
simulation. These output files include slice/vector slice, boundary, particle,
isosurface, and PLOT3D files. Both types of slice files (slice and vector) are
positioned via an X, Y, or Z axis location and record cross-sectional simulation
data along their specified planar location. Their primary difference is that vector
slice files represent direction of motion using vector-based arrows. Boundary
files store surface measurements for the compartment’s walls and its contents.
Particle files are used to track particle movement including water vapor and
element flow. Isosurfaces typically record a fire’s heat release rate per unit area
and its mixture fraction (division of smoke and fire). Lastly, PLOT3D files provide
simulation snapshots at predefined intervals. In addition to the documented
output files, FDS also generates comma-separated-value files denoted by a
“.csv” extension. Similar to the scenario input data file, the comma-separatedvalue files store simulation measurements in plain text format. Therefore, these
files may easily be imported into other programs for further analysis.

3.4

Computational Software Model

A detailed analysis of computational fluid dynamic (CFD) theory is beyond the
scope of this research. However, this section serves as a cursory introduction to
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the fundamentals involved in FDS’s computational software model. Further detail
and thorough analysis may be found in the FDS Technical Reference Guide [45].

Historically, initial attempts at fire simulation revolved around zone-based fire
models. In these representations, a combustion environment is divided into two
homogenous levels, a heated upper layer and a cool lower layer, and
calculations are performed independently in each layer via algebraic or
differential equations. Further information may be found as Quintiere chronicles
the zone model’s progress through 1983 [46]. Although zone models enjoy
widespread implementation, they are limited in that they don’t allow for “detailed
spatial distributions of physical properties” and can not be systematically
improved [42].

The next evolution in computational fire modeling involves the first CFD field
models. These models are almost entirely based on work performed by
Patankar and Spalding [47]. Specifically, the techniques involved rely on the k—
ε turbulence model where k is the turbulent kinetic energy (TKE) and ε is the TKE
dissipation rate. This model is most commonly cited in Patankar and Spalding’s
SIMPLE and SIMPLER methods which implement Poisson equations for
pressure correction [48].
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A more refined version of the field models, the Large Eddy Simulation (LES) CFD
model forms the underpinnings of FDS simulation. This methodology finds its
grounding in the fundamental Navier-Stokes equations. Explicitly, a simplified
version of the Navier-Stokes equations developed by Rehm and Baum, referred
to as the “low Mach number” combustion equations, is exploited to reduce
computation times. This simplification is realized by filtering out large acoustic
variations in temperature and density and results in an elliptic quality that is more
characteristic of low-speed convective processes [45].

Established by the user in a scenario’s input data file, FDS divides the fire
compartment into smaller, more manageable regions. These regions, or grid
cells, determine the resolution of a fire scenario. FDS calculations occur inside
each cell of the scenario’s computational grid, are assumed to be uniform within
a particular cell, and vary only with time [45]. Beginning with the conservative
equations of mass, species, momentum, and energy, NIST uses an
approximation of the ideal gas law to relate thermodynamic values. This
approximation is referred to as an equation of state and divides overall pressure
into three components, background, hydrostatic, and flow-induced perturbation.
However, it is noted that the latter two components are relatively small and the
background pressure typically dominates. It should be recognized that the
energy conservation equation is not directly solved. Instead, its terms give rise to

38

the divergence constraint equation. Therefore, the resulting simulation equations
are:
Conservation of Mass

∂ρ
+ u ⋅ ∇ ρ = ρ∇ ⋅ u
∂t
Conservation of Species
∂ρYi
+ u ⋅ ∇ρYi = −ρYi ∇ ⋅ u + ∇ ⋅ ρD∇Yi + m& i′′′
∂t

Conservation of Momentum

∂u
1
+ u × ω + ∇Η = ((ρ - ρ ∞ )g + f + ∇ ⋅ τ)
∂t
ρ
Divergence Constraint

∇ ⋅u =

1 
1  dp 0
  1
−
 ∇ ⋅ k∇T + ∇ ⋅ ∑ ∫ c p,i dT ρD i ∇Yi − ∇ ⋅ q r + q& ′′′  + 
ρc p T 
i
  ρc pT p 0  dt

Equation of State
p 0 (t ) = ρTℜ∑
i

Yi
ρT ℜ
=
Mi
M

and variable descriptions are included in Appendix D [45]. Before continuing, a
few mathematical symbols must be discussed. First, the gradient or grad
operator ( ∇ ) represents a differential operator with the denotation

∇=(

∂ ∂ ∂
∂
∂
∂
j + k , where i, j, and k are unit vectors along the x,
, , )= i+
∂x ∂y ∂z
∂x
∂y
∂z

y, and z axes. When used with scalar values, the gradient results in the following
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vector equivalence ∇ρ =

∂ρ
∂ρ
∂ρ
i+
j + k . When applied to vectors, the gradient
∂x
∂y
∂z

results in a tensor or vector whose magnitude is directionally dependent.
Secondly, the divergence or div operator (·) is a dot notation abbreviation
characterized by div(u) = ∇ ⋅ u =

∂u x ∂u y ∂u z
+
. The divergence function is only
+
∂x
∂y
∂z

valid for vector values and produces a scalar quantity [49]. Armed with these
definitions, the previously-mentioned equations may now be explored. The
conservation of mass equation is represented as a material derivative (

∂ρ
) and
∂t

relies on the time rate of change in a material particle’s density (ρ) within the
three-dimensional space defined by the velocity vector (u). This constraint
ensures that material is neither created nor destroyed through the process of
combustion. In addition to previously mentioned variables, the species
conservation equation preserves ingredient balance throughout the compartment
by considering volumetric production rate ( m& i′′′ ), elemental mass fractions (Yi),
and diffusion coefficient (D). The left portion of the equivalence describes
species accumulation due to density change and species inflow and outflow.
Meanwhile, the right portion counters with species inflow and outflow due to
diffusion and elemental production rates. Conservation of momentum provides a
velocity and pressure coupling to preserve momentum within the fluidic
representation. Momentum-altering affects caused by the environment’s vorticity
(ω), viscosity ( τ ), gravity (g), and external forces excluding gravity (f) are
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accounted for. Also notice that variations in applicable gravitational forces due to
changes in material density and existing particle velocities are represented. The
divergence constraint calculates and limits particle flow deviation through the
combination of the material derivative, conservation of mass, and conservation of
energy terms. The integral term accounts for reaction enthalpy by assuming
constant specific heat over the temperature range. The assumption of
temperature-independent specific heat only results in the exclusion of minor
divergence terms while greatly reducing calculation costs [45]. Lastly, the
equation of state establishes an equivalency between background pressure at a
given time, p0(t), and the product of density (ρ), temperature (T), and the
universal gas constant ( ℜ ) divided by material mass (M). The low Mach number
equations assume that density and temperature are inversely proportional. It
should also be recognized that the product of density and volume yields mass
(ρV = M). This relation, in conjunction with the equation of state, roughly
resolves to the ideal gas law (PV = n ℜ T), differing only by the number of moles
of gas (n). In practice, FDS also uses the equation of state to calculate
temperature.

Within the realm of fire simulation, software tools serve as an excellent means of
fire hazard analysis. One such program that has been shown, through practical
experimentation, to be particularly adept at modeling fire scenarios is NIST’s Fire
Dynamics Simulator. In conjunction with its visualization counterpart,
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Smokeview, FDS can provide tremendous amounts of data and insight. This
information may be used to investigate, verify, augment or, in some cases,
supplant real-world fire situations and thereby reduce expense and possible loss.
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Chapter 4
Investigative Approach

4.1

Overview

With the intent of demonstrating damage potential and exploring aspects of
layout and design, the subsequent investigation considers various facets of data
center fire hazards. These elements include possible post-fire outcomes and
methods of suppression. This exploration is facilitated through the
implementation of NIST’s Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) software package
discussed in Chapter 3. Through these simulations, a clearer understanding of
data center fire vulnerability can be gleaned.

4.2

Assumptions

Because a fire’s inception possesses a single point of origin before spreading,
the data center combustion model constructed in this study is simplified to a
single rack-mounted computer system. Enhancing the model’s flexibility, this
evaluation allows for the simulation of behavior and pyrolysis product generation
related to a single electronic unit. Additional fuel loads, such as supplementary
rack systems or wiring interconnects, may then be considered individually or as
targets of preliminary flame propagation. The previous analysis has shown that
the first step in any effective computer room fire suppression system is to shunt
electrical power to the compartment and disengage ventilation systems.
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Therefore, it was unnecessary to model damage incurred by electrical arcing or
forced-air draft environments. Finally, to ensure maximum available fuel
exposure, the upper surface of the lowest circuit board was selected as the point
of ignition. These assumptions help to establish a theoretical worst-case
scenario after fire detection.

4.3

Experimental Model

The selected experimental model represents a vertical, rack-mount computer
enclosure characteristic of a data center. This particular cabinet contains six
individual circuit board tray divisions and is constructed of steel. Paralleling
previous small-scale fire tests performed by NIST [50], PMMA is chosen as an
adequate representation of a typical printed circuit board fuel load. The data
center walls are represented as concrete structures consistent with typical
construction.

Both unsuppressed (free burn) and water suppressed simulations are
implemented. The factors dictating sprinkler effectiveness are droplet size and
distribution, momentum of spray, ceiling clearance, and magnitude of fire [51].
Due to water mist’s infancy and implementation variation, an adequate
standardized model of a misting sprinkler, including droplet size and distribution,
is unavailable. Therefore, for its extended coverage potential, the default Central
K-11 sprinkler is implemented within the various suppression tests (Appendix E).
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Finally, based on projected methods of extinguishment, an in-cabinet fire
suppression system is implemented.

4.4

Parameters

For layout purposes, the FDS coordinate system is based on a three-dimensional
Cartesian grid composed of X, Y, and Z axes. The physical enclosure was
modeled as a 2.5 m x 3.0 m x 3.0 m (8.20 ft. x 9.84 ft. x 9.84 ft.) area. These
dimensions established a compartment space large enough to visualize products
of combustion while simultaneously allowing for the observation of radiative and
convective effects via boundary conditions. The steel rack-mount cabinet was
centered in the room and measured 0.7 m x 0.6 m x 2.0 m (2.30 ft. x 1.97 ft. x
6.56 ft.). Each of the six circuit boards was 0.6 m x 0.6 m x 0.005 m (23.62 in. x
23.62 in. x 0.20 in.) in dimension. Thermocouples were placed 10 cm (3.94 in.)
in front of each circuit board. Both circuit boards and thermocouples were
labeled from one through six beginning with those at the lowest Z-axis value. To
ensure adequate fidelity, a 50 cell x 60 cell x 120 cell computational grid was
established. This resulted in an array of 360,000 cells measuring 5 cm x 5 cm x
2.5 cm (1.97 inches x 1.97 inches x 0.98 inches). As a side note, these
specifications resulted in average processing times of one to almost three weeks
on a 2.8 GHz Pentium 4 equivalent machine with 1 Gigabyte of memory. The
prescribed layout is shown in Figure 4.4.1.
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Figure 4.4.1. Compartment Design
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Based on previous analysis, telecommunication facility fires typically commence
with 5-10 kW potentials [52]. In comparison, small trash can fires may generate
heat release rates of more than 15 kW [53] and typically reach rates of 100 kW.
Therefore, a worst-case-scenario heat release rate of 10 kW was initially
selected and expanded upon. For comparative purposes, fires were defined in
two manners. The first method implemented FDS’s vent syntax and established
a fire over a portion of a circuit board. Subsequent tests employed FDS’s
surface syntax to define a broader site of combustion that covered the entire
upper surface of a circuit board. Suppressed and unsuppressed tests were
performed under each scheme. A summary of the set of experimental fire
simulations is contained in Table 4.4.1. Within this table, suppression posture is
defined by the sprinkler’s physical location within the cabinet followed by its spray
orientation. Therefore, a designation of “back aimed forward” may be read such
that a sprinkler was positioned at the rear of the cabinet and aimed outward
(parallel to the compartment floor) toward the thermocouples. Due to cabinet
symmetry, sprinklers placed on the right side and aimed left could just as easily
be interpreted as being placed on the left side and aimed right. However, as
computer cabinets are typically arranged side-by-side in rows, data center
layouts are more accommodating of rear-mounted fire suppression systems.
Hence, a larger number of simulations operated under that methodology.
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Table 4.4.1. Set of Experimental Fire Simulations
Containment Presence / Posture
Fire Type
Unsuppressed
Vent
Unsuppressed
Surface
Unsuppressed
Surface
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed forward)
Vent
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed forward)
Vent
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed forward)
Surface
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed forward)
Surface
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed downward)
Vent
Suppressed (K-11 Back aimed left)
Vent
Suppressed (K-11 Right aimed left)
Vent
Suppressed (K-11 Right aimed left)
Surface
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Heat Release Rate
10 kW
10 kW
1,296 kW
10 kW
1,296 kW
10 kW
1,296 kW
10 kW
10 kW
10 kW
1,296 kW

As a method to dictate fire potential, FDS draws on its Heat Release Rate Per
Unit Area (HRRPUA) keyword designation. Fire vent dimensions of 0.05 m x
0.05 m established a HRRPUA of 4,000 kW/m2 (4,000 kW/m2 x 0.0025 m2 = 10
kW). In surface tests, the upper surface of the lowest circuit board was defined
as the source of combustion. This established a 0.6 m by 0.6 m surface area
which necessitated a HRRPUA value of 28 kW/m2 (28 kW/m2 x 0.36 m2 = 10
kW). In an effort to investigate the impact of a large-fire, further testing
investigated greater heat release rates. Within the fire protection arena, a heat
release rate of 1,000 kW is commonly accepted as a small-room flashover
threshold. In some cases, slightly higher values may be reported. Therefore,
large-fire impacts were explored by observing fires possessing heat release rates
of nearly 1,300 kW (3,600 kW/m2 x 0.36 m2 = 1,296 kW). Paralleling this
discussion, sample FDS input file listings are contained in Appendix F.

Although an infinite number of simulation combinations exists, this particular set
of experiments examined key aspects of simulated fire type, presence or
absence of containment, and proposed minimum and maximum heat release rate
values. Adjustments in suppression orientation and placement accounted for the
largest parameter variance, followed by fire type and size. These trials
reinforced the need for future investigation and innovation.
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Chapter 5
Results

5.1

Overview

Variations in fire size (small or large), combustion type (vent or surface),
suppression availability (present or absent), and suppression posture (location
and orientation) allowed for the construction of numerous fire scenarios. In all,
various aspects of eleven independent simulations were explored. However,
acknowledging and appreciating the development of common themes and
trends, the following analysis focuses on unsuppressed and suppressed versions
of the more representative FDS vent-style fire.

5.2

Thermal Effects

Thermal effects were observed and measured via a number of methods including
isosurface, various slice files, boundary measurements, and a six-node
thermocouple tree. Isosurfaces provided tangible representations of fire flow and
flame impingement. Although extracted from an unsuppressed fire simulation,
the isosurface example shown in Figure 5.2.1 represents initial fire spread
common to both suppressed and unsuppressed scenarios. It illustrates direct
flame impingement on circuit boards one and two. Low heat release rate
scenarios demonstrated significant flame contact to circuit boards one, two, and
three. Meanwhile, large heat release rate scenarios revealed flames washing
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Figure 5.2.1. Isosurface Example
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over all six circuit boards. These types of sustained fire contact typically spell
disaster for the functionality of components in question.

Slice files, both normal and vector, assisted in the measurement of fire properties
and gaseous flow and entrainment. The examples in Figure 5.2.2 are
representative of slice file appearance and implementation. Within the sphere of
thermal effects, normal slice files captured and displayed the continuous
temperature gradient and heat concentrations as combustion progressed. Vector
slices captured these elements as well. However, they also provided directional
heat flow and intensity and gaseous entrainment insight. Allowing more flexibility
in placement, slice file data corroborated the abovementioned damage
assessment and provided numeric temperature readings as support.

Boundary file options provided further insight into potential thermal damage. By
recording surface thermal properties, boundary files illustrated destructive
potential to the computer cabinet via temperature, radiative flux, and conductive
flux measurements. Because these measurements are not only restricted to the
computer cabinet, but are also captured for the compartment’s walls, prospective
damage for additional fire targets may be assessed as shown in Figure 5.2.3.
Once again, using boundary file surface temperature measurements, both circuit
board and computer cabinet damage was observed. Figure 5.2.4 represents
peak combustion surface temperatures for the unsuppressed, small heat release
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Figure 5.2.2. Slice File Examples (Normal and Vector)
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Figure 5.2.3. Boundary File Examples (Temperature, Radiative Flux, and
Convective Flux)
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Figure 5.2.4. Boundary Temperature Measurements (Small HRR)
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rate fire. Similarly, Figure 5.2.5 displays the same measurements for the
unsuppressed, large heat release rate scenario. Accepting NFPA’s relatively
forgiving functional computer equipment thermal threshold of 79.4°C, even in the
smaller fire scenarios, it should be noted that excessive and damaging
temperatures were inflicted on all circuit boards.

Represented as the yellow boxes in front of each circuit board, thermocouples
imparted a further means of evaluating thermal conditions. Figure 5.2.6 shows
numeric temperature measurements taken over time during the unsuppressed
burn with small heat release rate. The thermocouples registered peak values
after approximately 250 seconds of combustion with the highest readings
occurring at levels above the site of ignition. Specifically, thermocouples 3 and 4
registered values approaching 650°C (1,202°F). Additional heat-related
simulation aspects, Figures 5.2.7 through 5.2.11, are represented below. As
additional material became involved, heat release rates of over 130 kW were
observed. Radiative loss levels climbed slightly higher than 75 kW. Convective
gains barely topped 1.30 kW. Lastly, heat loss due to conduction peaked at
slightly more than 30 kW. Although various scales are denoted, these thermalproperty figures all possess near-peak values that are coincident with the fire’s
maximum burn rate. As the fuel supply was depleted, the fire’s size diminished
and values declined and began to return to pre-blaze conditions.
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Figure 5.2.5. Boundary Temperature Measurements (Large HRR)
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Figure 5.2.6. Thermocouple Plot
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Figure 5.2.7. Heat Release Rate Plot
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Figure 5.2.8. Radiation Loss Plot
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Figure 5.2.9. Convection Loss Plot
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Figure 5.2.10. Conduction Loss Plot
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Figure 5.2.11. Burn Rate Plot
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Although explicit times and quantitative measurements were initially unknown,
these types of results were anticipated and are consistent with general fire
experience. In large-fire simulations, flame intensity grew dramatically and
combustion rates multiplied. Similar tests involving telecommunication switch
gear bays showed thermocouples reaching peak values in approximately 10-12
minutes and flames leaping to heights of 2-4 meters (6.56-13.12 feet) above a
cabinet [39]. Before burning out, analogous results were recreated via the
unsuppressed, large heat release rate simulation with the result of direct flame
impingement on the compartment ceiling, as shown in Figure 5.2.12.

Simulations involving standard sprinkler suppression emphasized water-mistingliterature findings and produced a mixed outcome. As shown in Figure 5.2.13,
although the course-spray, K-11 sprinkler was successful in drastically reducing
combustion and cleansing the cabinet’s interior of fire products, its low-density
spray and large droplets were not reliably able to entirely extinguish the fire after
activation. In this figure, inactive and active sprinklers are represented by red
and green blocks, respectively. Upon sprinkler activation, water simultaneously
worked to contain the fire and force it out of the enclosure. Although the fire was
not always extinguished, it should be noted that the presence of fire suppression
yielded appreciable results, as shown by the suppressed thermocouple plot in
Figure 5.2.14. While the temperature spike occurred at approximately the same
point in time as the unsuppressed example, its peak values were lower and fell
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Figure 5.2.12. Ceiling Flame Impingement
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Figure 5.2.13. Sprinkler Activation and Suppression
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Figure 5.2.14. Suppressed Thermocouple Plot
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off rapidly as the sprinklers doused the cabinet with water. Except for
thermocouples located in the fire’s immediate vicinity, temperatures quickly fell to
below 75°C. These results confirmed water-based sprinkler effectiveness and
demonstrated excellent potential for component protection.

5.3

Mixture Fraction

Similar to the HRR isosurface, FDS’s mixture fraction isosurface allowed for
direct visualization of fire and smoke production and integration. Seen both
emblematically through isosurface (Figure 5.3.1) and fluidically via slice file
(Figure 5.3.2), the mixture fraction representation exhibited toxic gas flow
patterns, illustrated key areas of impact, and identified sites of increased
corrosive damage. As shown in Figure 5.3.1, the mixture fraction isosurface
denoted flame and smoke separation in an observable, yet visually-obstructive
manner. However, the partial transparency of a mixture fraction slice file allowed
for greater visualization of flame and smoke separation and flow.

5.4

Species

A final source of data produced by FDS was that of species production. Species
results modeled classic trends. As the fire burned on, fuel and oxygen levels
decreased. Meanwhile, soot, water, and toxic/corrosive gas levels increased. In
particular, carbon dioxide (CO2), as its levels climbed almost 4 kg, and nitrogen
(N2), augmented by nearly 2 kg, amounts experienced the largest
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Figure 5.3.1. Isosurface Mixture Fraction

66

Figure 5.3.2. Slice File Mixture Fraction
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increases. Although the compartment’s initial oxygen supply decreased greatly,
large amounts of water vapor were formed. As the water vapor and the nitrogen
content of the fire’s byproducts combined, it should be noted that corrosive
nitrous and nitric acids were formed and deposited.

Because species data was generated for the overall fire compartment, localized
deposition of corrosive agents and soot could not be accurately determined. One
possible method of estimation would be to assume a uniform byproduct
distribution throughout the fire compartment. Under this premise, individual mass
increases could be divided by the number of computational grid cells. Continuing
this line of thought, area-specific deposition amounts could be determined by
calculating the number of grid cells intersected by the target in question. For
example, in the data presented within Figure 5.4.1, nitrogen levels increased by
1.42 kg (1.42 x 109 µg). The simulation grid was designed to have 360,000
computational cells measuring 5 cm in width and length. Each circuit board in
the simulation measured 60 cm in width and length. Consequently, the upper
surface of a single circuit board would intersect 144 cells. Therefore, quick
division (1.42 x 109 µg / 360,000) yields an approximate concentration of 3,944
µg per cell. With 144 affected cells (5.68 x 105 µg) spanning 3,600 cm2,
additional calculation (5.68 x 105 µg / 3,600 cm2) equates to contamination levels
of 157.8 µg/cm2. Unfortunately, as it has been previously established, soot and
corrosive byproducts are not homogeneously distributed throughout an
68
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Figure 5.4.1. Species Plot
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atmosphere of combustion. Hence, an assumption of uniformity would yield
inaccurate results.

As these results have shown, thermal effects, mixture fraction, and species
production each play a pivotal role in fire outcomes. Fortunately, or unfortunately
as the case may be, it was discovered that the fire’s thermal effects dominated
the verdict of component tenability. These results proffered valuable information
related to data center fires and equipment survival.

70

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work

6.1

Recommendations

Although by no means comprehensive, this work serves as a catalyst to further
research in the field of computer fire modeling. The use of computer-based
simulation tools provides a valuable avenue of insight and protection. Through
scenario modeling, several fire effects and suppression techniques may be
explored that would otherwise prove to be too costly or impractical. It has been
shown that computer data centers pose a vulnerability to the effects of fire—
especially thermal aspects. It became readily apparent that even relatively small
fires common to this venue have disastrous potential. Given the level of
importance surrounding data and equipment in computing environments, this
liability may be quite significant. Water-based suppression tests yielded some
self-evident results. Those being, sprinklers are more effective when positioned
closer to and oriented toward the source of combustion. Although standard
sprinkler equipment proved to be helpful, further exploration of hybridized gaswater and water mist suppression techniques is also merited. Obvious areas of
future exploration include full-scale, real-life test burns and additional simulation.
The value of future investigative results may also be enhanced by the inclusion of
modeled detection systems.
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As referenced in the FDS User’s Guide, simulations and calculations are based
on an evolving fire model and, given the correct conditions, can be accurate to
within 10%-20% [45]. The complexity involved in fire modeling mandates an
understanding of implied assumptions and technological limitations. As
investigation continues to reveal new insights, FDS’s computational fluid
dynamics model can be updated. However, in the analysis of this scenario, the
simulation provided findings that were consistent with anticipated outcomes.
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Appendix A
Fire Factors Affecting Human Tenability [54]
Radiant Heat
Exposure at Different Incident Levels of Thermal Radiation
Radiant
Heat
Human Exposure Limits*
(kW/m2)
35 to 37.5 100% lethality in 1 min; 1% lethality in 10 seconds
25.0
100% lethality in 1 min; significant injury in 10 seconds
12.5 to
1% lethality in 1 min; first-degree burns in 10 seconds
15.0
Pain threshold reached after 8 seconds; second-degree burns after 20
9.5
seconds
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20
4.0 to 5.0 seconds; however, blistering of the skin (second-degree burns) is likely; 0%
lethality
1.6
Causes no discomfort for long exposure
* With exposed skin
Expected Damage for Various Thermal Radiation Levels (kW/m2)
Exposure
U.S.
U.K. New
DOT
South
Wales
1. Causes pain after 1 min of exposure
—
—
2.1
2. Will cause pain in 15 to 20 seconds and injury (second5
6.3
4.7
degree burns) after 30 seconds
12.5
10
12.6
3. Significant chance of fatality for extended exposure; high
chance of injury after exposures of less than 30 seconds.
Building made of cellulosic materials may suffer minor damage
after prolonged exposure
21.0
—
23.0
4. Extended exposure results in fatality; there is a chance of
fatality for instantaneous exposure. Buildings that are made of
cellulosic materials or not fire resistant will suffer damage after
short exposures. Fire-resistant structures and metal may suffer
damage after prolonged exposure
31.5
—
35.0
5. Significant chance of fatality for people with instantaneous
exposure. Fire-resistant structures suffer damage after short
duration. Buildings of cellulosic materials ignite
spontaneously. Metal fatigue after short to medium exposure
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Convective Heat Exposure
Temperature Effect

260°F

Difficult breathing

300°F

Mouth breathing very difficult, temperature limit for escape

320°F

Rapid, unbearable pain with dry skin

360°F

Irreversible injury in 30 seconds

400°F

Respiratory system tolerance time less than 4 min with wet skin

Oxygen Depletion
Effects of Oxygen Depletion
Percent of
Symptoms
Oxygen in Air
20
Normal
Respiration volume increases, muscular coordination diminishes,
17
attention and thinking clearly requires more effort
Shortness of breath, headache, dizziness, quickened pulse, efforts
12 to 15
fatigue quickly, muscular coordination for skilled movements lost
10 to 12
Nausea and vomiting, exertion impossible, paralysis of motion
6 to 8
Collapse and unconsciousness occurs
6 or below
Death in 6 to 8 min
Four Stages of Asphyxiation
Stage Percent Oxygen by
Symptoms
Volume
st
1
21 to 14%
Increased pulse and breathing rate with disturbed
muscular coordination
nd
2
14 to 10%
Faulty judgment, rapid fatigue, and insensitivity to pain
3rd
10 to 6%
Nausea and vomiting, collapse, and permanent brain
damage
4th
Less than 6%
Convulsion, breathing stopped, and death

Toxic Products of Combustion
80

Rule-of-Thumb for Carbon Monoxide (CO) hazard:

•

Concentration (ppm) x Time (minutes) > approx. 30,000 ppm-min is likely
dangerous

Limiting Conditions for Toxic Products of Combustion
Chemical Products 5-Min Exposure
30-Min Exposure
Incapacitation
Death
Incapacitation
Death
Carbon monoxide
6000 ppm
12,000 ppm
1400 ppm
2500 ppm
Low oxygen
< 13%
< 5%
< 12%
< 7%
Carbon dioxide
> 7%
> 10%
> 6%
> 9%

Visibility Through Smoke
Proposed minimum visibility requirements for egress:

•
•

3 meters in primary fire compartment
10 meters in escape route
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Appendix B
Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Fire Extinguishing
Systems [30]

Water Sprinkler System
Advantages
• Cools the equipment
• Completely safe for the
environment and personnel
• Often less expensive to install and
use
• Often uses only one system
throughout a building
• The release of water can be
localized to where it is needed

•
•
•

•
•
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Disadvantages
Impurities in the water may ruin
computer microchips and other
equipment
Electrical danger may exist if an
automatic electricity cut-off system
has not been installed
Sprinklers usually do not activate
until the temperature reaches 135°F,
when damage to electronic
components, magnetic tape, and
disks may already have occurred
May not reach a fire located within
a cabinet or piece of equipment
It can be difficult or impossible to
restore equipment and recover data
after sprinklers have been operated

Halon 1301 System
Advantages
• Extinguishes fire without damaging
computer hardware or software
• Does not conduct electricity
• Puts out fires inside equipment and
furniture and in areas that a water
sprinkler cannot easily reach
• The computer room can be fully
operational within a couple of hours
after the fire has been extinguished

•
•
•

•

•
•
•
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Disadvantages
Halon compounds contribute to the
destruction of the ozone layer
Can be a health hazard, particularly
to personnel suffering from asthma
or heart problems
Release of the gas is extremely
powerful, strong enough to throw
equipment off desks, bring down
false ceilings, and smash windows
It may take considerable time to
gain approval for the installation of
Halon 1301, because of the
environmental concerns
Can be expensive
The fire may reignite if the gas is
evacuated prematurely from the fire
site
The gas fills the entire room in
which the fire is located

Appendix C
Partial Listing of Water Misting Technology Interest [38]

Group
Civil Aviation Authority
Darchem Engineering
FAA Technical Center
Factory Mutual Research
Fire Research Station
DEC Avionics
Greenwich University
IEI
Kidde-Fenwal
Kidde-Graviner
Marrioff
NRC-Canada/NFL
NRL
Securiplex Technology
SINTEF
Southbank Polytechnic
SP

Location
U.K.
U.K.
Atlantic City, NJ
Norwood MA
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
Australia
USA
U.K.
Finland
Canada
Washington, D.C.
Canada
Norway
U.K.
Sweden
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Appendix D
FDS Variable Descriptions [45]

Symbol
cp
D
f
g
Η
k
m& ′′′
Mi
p
p0
qr
q& ′′′
ℜ
T
t

τ

u = (u,v,w)
Yi
ρ
ω = (ωx,ωy,ωz)

Description
Constant pressure specific heat
Diffusion coefficient
External force vector (excluding gravity)
Acceleration of gravity
Total pressure divided by the density
Thermal conductivity; suppression decay factor
Production rate of ith species per unit volume
Molecular weight of ith gas species
Pressure
Background pressure
Radiative heat flux vector
Heat release rate per unit volume
Universal gas constant
Temperature
Time
Viscous stress tensor
Velocity vector
Mass fraction of ith species
Density
Vorticity vector
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Appendix E
FDS Default Parameter File Listing for Central K-11 Sprinkler [42]

MANUFACTURER
Central
MODEL
K-11
OPERATING_PRESSURE
1.30
K-FACTOR

166.
RTI
148.
C-FACTOR
0.7
OFFSET_DISTANCE

0.20
ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE
74.
SIZE_DISTRIBUTION
1
900.,2.43,0.58
VELOCITY

Manufacturer Information
Sprinkler Model
Sprinkler operating pressure in units of bar.
K-Factor of sprinkler in units of L/min/(bar)1/2.
(Default 166) The flow rate will be given by mw
= K√p where mw is the flow rate in L/min, K
the K-factor in L/min/(bar) 1/2 and p the gauge
pressure in bar
Response Time Index of the sprinkler in units
of pm·s. (Default 165.)
C-Factor of sprinkler in units of pm/s. (Default
0)
Distance in meters from the sprinkler orifice
where the water droplets are initialized. It is
assumed that beyond the OFFSET
DISTANCE the droplets have completely
broken up. (Default 0.10 m)
Link activation temperature (C). (Default
74°C)
Information about the droplet size distribution.
Description of the initial droplet velocity
distribution.

1
30. 80. 10.0
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Appendix F
Sample FDS Input File Listings
Vent Unsuppressed
&HEAD CHID='thesis',TITLE='Computer Cabinet – VentUnsuppressed' /
* Dimensions 2.5m wide x 3.0m deep x 3.0m tall
&PDIM XBAR=2.50,YBAR=3.00,ZBAR=3.00 /
* 50 cells wide x 60 cells deep x 120 cells tall = 360,000 cells
* cells 0.05m x 0.05m x 0.025m
&GRID IBAR=50,JBAR=60,KBAR=120 /
* time when finished = 1200 s
&TIME TWFIN=1200. /
* reaction is MMA, default surface is 'CONCRETE'
* data saved every TWFIN/NFRAMES = 1200s/2400 = 0.5 s
&MISC REACTION='MMA',NFRAMES=2400,SURF_DEFAULT='CONCRETE',
DATABASE='c:\nist\fds\database3\database3.data' /
* Fire called 'HEATER' with output = 4000 kW/m^2
* Worst-case scenario 10kW fire
* Heater surface .05m x .05m = approx. 0.0025 m^2 => approx. 10kW fire
&SURF ID='HEATER',HRRPUA=4000. /
* Creates vent with properties of 'HEATER'
* .05m wide x .05m deep on circuit board 1 (lowest)
&VENT XB=1.275,1.325,1.00,1.050,0.215,0.215,SURF_ID='HEATER' /
* COMPUTER CABINET
* circuit board 1
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.210000, 0.215000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 1
* circuit board 2
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.425000, 0.430000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 2
* circuit board 3
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.640000, 0.645000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 3
* circuit board 4
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&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.855000, 0.860000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 4
* circuit board 5
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 1.070000, 1.075000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 5
* circuit board 6
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 1.285000, 1.290000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 6
* left side
&OBST XB=0.950000, 1.000000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.000000, 2.000000,
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Left Side
* right side
&OBST XB=1.600000, 1.650000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.000000, 2.000000,
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Right Side
* back
&OBST XB=0.950000, 1.650000, 1.600000, 1.650000, 0.000000, 2.000000,
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Back
* top
&OBST XB=0.950000, 1.650000, 1.000000, 1.650000, 2.000000, 2.050000,
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Top
* THERMOCOUPLE TREE
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.215,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.430,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.645,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.860,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,1.075,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,1.290,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
*******************************************************************
* SLICE FILES
*******************************************************************
* VECTOR
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center
x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center
y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center y
* NON-VECTOR
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* CENTER
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Center y
* LEFT SIDE
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Left x
* RIGHT SIDE
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Left x
* BACK
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Back y
*******************************************************************
89

* BOUNDARY FILES
&BNDF QUANTITY='GAUGE_HEAT_FLUX' /
&BNDF QUANTITY='BURNING_RATE' /
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL_TEMPERATURE' /
&BNDF QUANTITY='CONVECTIVE_FLUX' /
&BNDF QUANTITY='RADIATIVE_FLUX' /
Surface Suppressed (Sprinkler at back of cabinet aimed forward)
&HEAD CHID='thesis',TITLE='Computer Cabinet – SurfaceBackAimedForward' /
* Dimensions 2.5m wide x 3.0m deep x 3.0m tall
&PDIM XBAR=2.50,YBAR=3.00,ZBAR=3.00 /
* 50 cells wide x 60 cells deep x 120 cells tall = 360,000 cells
* cells 0.05m x 0.05m x 0.025m
&GRID IBAR=50,JBAR=60,KBAR=120 /
* time when finished = 1200 s
&TIME TWFIN=1200. /
* reaction is MMA, default surface is 'CONCRETE'
* data saved every TWFIN/NFRAMES = 1200s/2400 = .5 s
&MISC REACTION='MMA',NFRAMES=2400,SURF_DEFAULT='CONCRETE',
DATABASE='c:\nist\fds\database3\database3.data',RESTART_FILE='thesis.rest
art',
DATABASE_DIRECTORY='c:\nist\fds\database3\' /
* Fire called 'HEATER' with output = 27.8 kW/m^2
* Worst-case scenario 10kW fire
* Heater surface .6m x .6m = approx. 0.36 m^2 => approx. 10kW fire
&SURF ID='HEATER',HRRPUA=28. /
* COMPUTER CABINET
* circuit board 1
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.210000, 0.215000,
SURF_IDS='HEATER','PMMA','PMMA' / Circuit Board - 1
* circuit board 2
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.425000, 0.430000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 2
* circuit board 3
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.640000, 0.645000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 3
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* circuit board 4
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.855000, 0.860000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 4
* circuit board 5
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 1.070000, 1.075000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 5
* circuit board 6
&OBST XB=1.000000, 1.600000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 1.285000, 1.290000,
SURF_ID='PMMA' / Circuit Board - 6
* left side
&OBST XB=0.950000, 1.000000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.000000, 2.000000,
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Left Side
* right side
&OBST XB=1.600000, 1.650000, 1.000000, 1.600000, 0.000000, 2.000000,
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Right Side
* back
&OBST XB=0.950000, 1.650000, 1.600000, 1.650000, 0.000000, 2.000000,
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Back
* top
&OBST XB=0.950000, 1.650000, 1.000000, 1.650000, 2.000000, 2.050000,
SURF_ID='SHEET METAL' / Top
* THERMOCOUPLE TREE
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.215,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.430,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.645,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,0.860,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,1.075,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
&THCP XYZ=1.3,0.9,1.290,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' /
* SPRINKLERS
* Central K-11 ELO (Extra Large Opening) Sprinklers
* Alter default 0,0,-1 (downward) orientation to spray in -y direction
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 0.290,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 /
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 0.500,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 /
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 0.720,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 /
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 0.930,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 /
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 1.150,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 /
&SPRK XYZ=1.3 1.55 1.360,MAKE='K-11',ORIENTATION=0,-1,0 /
*******************************************************************
* SLICE FILES
*******************************************************************
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* VECTOR
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center
x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center
y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY',VECTOR=.TRUE. / Center y
* NON-VECTOR
* CENTER
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Center y
&SLCF PBX=1.30000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Center x
&SLCF PBY=1.30000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Center y
* LEFT SIDE
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.00000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Left x
* RIGHT SIDE
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Left x
&SLCF PBX=1.60000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Left x
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* BACK
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='VELOCITY' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='DENSITY' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='RADIANT_INTENSITY' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='MIXTURE_FRACTION' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='ABSORPTION_COEFFICIENT' / Back y
&SLCF PBY=1.60000,QUANTITY='HRRPUV' / Back y
*******************************************************************
* BOUNDARY FILES
&BNDF QUANTITY='GAUGE_HEAT_FLUX' /
&BNDF QUANTITY='BURNING_RATE' /
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL_TEMPERATURE' /
&BNDF QUANTITY='CONVECTIVE_FLUX' /
&BNDF QUANTITY='RADIATIVE_FLUX' /
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